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Abstract Suppose a person is engaged in a complex activity, such as teaching.
What determines what that person does, on a moment-by-moment basis, as he or
she engages in that activity? What resources does the person draw upon, and why?
What shapes the choices the person makes? I claim that if you know enough about a
teacher’s knowledge, goals, and beliefs, you can explain every decision he or she
makes, in the midst of teaching. In this paper I give examples showing what shapes
teachers’ decision-making, and explain the theory.
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Introduction
I became a mathematician for the simple reason that I love mathematics. Doing
mathematics can be a source of great pleasure: when you come to understand it, the
subject ﬁts together beautifully. Here I am not necessarily referring to advanced
mathematics. The child who notices that every time she adds two odd numbers the
result is even, wonders why, and the ﬁgures out the reason why:
Each odd number is made up of a number of pairs, and one ‘extra.’When you add two odd
numbers together, the extras make a pair. That means that the sum is made up of pairs, so
it’s even!
is doing real mathematics. It was that kind of experience that led me into
mathematics in the ﬁrst place.
Sadly, very few people develop this kind of understanding, or this kind of
pleasure in doing mathematics. It was this realization, and the thought that it might
be possible to do something to change it, that led me into mathematics education.
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For more than 35 years I have pursued the question, “How can we develop deeper
understandings of mathematical thinking, problem solving, and teaching, so that we
can help more children experience the pleasures of doing mathematics?”
My early work was devoted to mathematical problem solving. I read Pólya’s
(1945) bookHow to Solve It early in my mathematical career, and it resonated. Pólya
said that mathematicians used a wide range of problem solving strategies, which he
called heuristics. When he described them, I recognized them—I used them too! I
wondered, though, why I had not explicitly been taught those strategies. The answer,
I learned, was that when people tried to teach the strategies described in Pólya’s
books, students did not learn to use them effectively. This was disappointing, but it
also represented a lovely challenge. Could we understand such problem solving
strategies well enough so that we could help students learn to use them effectively?
Thus began a decade’s worth of work in which I tried to develop an understanding
of problem solving: What do effective problem solvers do, which enables them to
solve difﬁcult problems? What do ineffective problem solvers do, that causes them to
fail in their problem solving attempts? What can we do, as teachers, to help students
become more effective problem solvers? My answers to those questions, which are
summarized very briefly below, were published in my 1985 book Mathematical
Problem Solving. The book resulted from a decade of simultaneous research on and
teaching of problem solving, in which my theoretical ideas were tried in the class-
room, and my experience in the classroom gave rise to more theoretical ideas.
Mathematical Problem Solving represented a solid ﬁrst step in a research
agenda. By the time it was written, I knew enough about problem solving to help
students become more effective problem solvers. A next, logical goal was to help
mathematics teachers to help their students develop deeper understandings of
mathematics. In many ways, of course, teaching is an act of problem solving—but it
is so much more. The challenge was, could I develop a theoretical understanding of
teaching in ways that allowed me to understand how and why teachers make the
choices they do, as they teach? Could that understanding then be used to help
teachers become more effective? Moreover, to the degree that teaching is typical of
knowledge-intensive decision making, could the theoretical descriptions of teaching
be used to characterize decision making in other areas as well?
Those questions have been at the core of my research agenda for the past
25 years. My answers to them now exist, in a new book, How We Think
(Schoenfeld 2010). The purpose of this paper is to illustrate and explain the main
ideas in the book. Because my current research has evolved from my earlier
problem solving work, I set the stage for the discussion that follows with a brief
description of that work—what it showed and, more importantly, the questions that
it did not answer. That will allow me to describe what a complete theory should be
able to accomplish. I then turn to the main body of this paper, three studies of
teaching. In those examples I show how, under certain circumstances, it is possible
to model the act of teaching, to the point where one can provide a grounded
explanation of every decision that a teacher makes during an extended episode of
teaching. Following that, I give some other examples to suggest that the theory is
general, and I make a few concluding comments.
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The Challenge
Suppose that you are in the middle of some “well practiced” activity, something
you have done often so that it is familiar to you. Depending on who you are, it
might be
• cooking a meal
• ﬁxing a car
• teaching a class
• doing medical diagnosis or brain surgery.
The challenge is this: If I know “enough” about you, can I explain (i.e., build a
cognitive model that explains) every single action you take and every decision you
make?
My goal for this paper is to describe an analytic structure that does just that—an
analytic structure that explains how andwhy people act theway they do, on amoment-
by-moment basis, in the midst of complex, often social activities such as teaching.
My major claim is this: People’s in-the-moment decision making when they
teach, and when they engage in other well practiced, knowledge intensive activities,
is a function of their knowledge and resources, goals, and beliefs and orientations.
Their decisions and actions can be “captured” (explained and modeled) in detail
using only these constructs.
The main substance of this paper (as in the book) consists of three analyses of
teaching, to convey the flavor of the work. Of course, it is no accident that I chose
mathematics teaching as the focal area for my analyses. I am, after all, a mathe-
matics educator! But more to the point, teaching is a knowledge intensive, highly
interactive, dynamic activity. If it is possible to validate a theory that explains
teachers’ decision making in a wide range of circumstances, then that theory should
serve to explain all well practiced behavior.
Background: Problem Solving
As discussed above, my current work is an outgrowth of my earlier research on
mathematical problem solving. Here I want to summarize the core ﬁndings of that
work, to show how it lays the groundwork for my current research.
My major argument about mathematical problem solving (see Schoenfeld 1985,
for detail) was that it is possible to explain someone’s success or failure in trying to
solve problems on the basis of the following four things:
1. Knowledge (or more broadly, resources). This is not exactly shocking—but,
knowing what knowledge and resources a problem solver has potentially at his
or her disposal is important.
2. Problem solving strategies, also known as “heuristics.” We know from Pólya’s
work that mathematicians use heuristic strategies, “rules of thumb for making
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progress when you do not know a direct way to a solution.” Faculty pick up
these strategies by themselves, through experience. Typically, students don’t use
them. But, my research showed that students can learn to use them.
3. “Metacognition,” or “Monitoring and self-regulation.” Effective problem
solvers plan, and they keep track of how well things are going as they imple-
ment their plans. If they seem to be making progress, they continue; if there are
difﬁculties, they re-evaluate and consider alternatives. Ineffective problem
solvers (including most students) do not do this. As a result, they can fail to
solve problems that they could solve. Students can learn to be more effective at
these kinds of behaviors.
4. Beliefs. Students’ beliefs about themselves and the nature of the mathematical
enterprise, derived from their experiences with mathematics, shape the knowl-
edge they draw upon during problem solving and the ways they do or do not use
that knowledge. For example, students who believe that “all problems can be
solved in 5 min or less” will stop working on problems even though, had they
persevered, they might have solved them. Students who believe that “proof has
nothing to do with discovery or invention” will, in the context of “discovery”
problems, make conjectures that contradict results they have just proven. (see
Schoenfeld 1985).
In sum: By 1985we knowwhat “counted” in mathematical problem solving, in the
sense that we could explain, post hoc, what accounted for success or failure. As the
ensuing 25 years have shown, this applied to all “goal-oriented” or problem solving
domains, including mathematics, physics, electronic trouble-shooting, and writing.
BUT… There was a lot that the framework that I have just described did not do.
In the research I conducted for Mathematical Problem Solving, people worked in
isolation on problems that I gave them to solve. Thus: the goals were established
(i.e., “solve this problem”); the tasks didn’t change while people worked on them;
and social interactions and considerations were negligible.
In addition, Mathematical Problem Solving offered a framework, not a theory.
Above and beyond pointing out what is important—which is what a framework
does—a theory should provide rigorous explanations of how and why things ﬁt
together. That is what my current work is about. What I have been working on for
the past 25 years is a theoretical approach that explains how and why people make
the choices they do, while working on issues they care about and have some
experience with, amidst dynamically changing social environments.
I can think of no better domain to study than teaching. Teaching is knowledge
intensive. It calls for instant decision making in a dynamically changing environ-
ment. It’s highly social. And, if you can model teaching, you can model just about
anything! I will argue that if you can model teaching, you can model: shopping;
preparing a meal; an ordinary day at work; automobile mechanics; brain surgery (or
any other medical practice), and other comparably complex, “well practiced”
behaviors. All of these activities involve goal-oriented behavior—drawing on
available resources (not the least of which is knowledge) and making decisions in
order to achieve outcomes you value.
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The goal of my work, and this paper, is to describe a theoretical architecture that
explains people’s decision-making during such activities.
How Things Work
My main theoretical claim is that goal-oriented “acting in the moment”—including
problem solving, tutoring, teaching, cooking, and brain surgery—can be explained
and modeled by a theoretical architecture in which the following are represented:
Resources (especially knowledge); Goals; Orientations (an abstraction of beliefs,
including values, preferences, etc.); and Decision-Making (which can be modeled
as a form of subjective cost-beneﬁt analysis). For substantiation, in excruciating
detail, please see my book, How we Think. To briefly provide substantiation I will
provide three examples in what follows. But ﬁrst, a top-level view of how things
work is given in Fig. 1. The basic structure is recursive: Individuals orient to
situations and decide (on the basis of beliefs and available resources) how to pursue
their goals. If the situation is familiar, they implement familiar routines; if things are
How Things Work
• An individual enters into a particular context with a specific body of resources, goals, 
and orientations.  
• The individual takes in and orients to the situation. Certain pieces of information and 
knowledge become salient and are activated.
• Goals are established (or reinforced if they pre-existed). 
• Decisions consistent with these goals are made, consciously or unconsciously, 
regarding what directions to pursue and what resources to use: 
-  If the situation is familiar, then the process may be relatively automatic, where the 
action(s) taken are in essence the access and implementation of scripts, frames, 
routines, or schemata. 
-  If the situation is not familiar or there is something non-routine about it, then 
decision-making is made by a mechanism that can be modeled by (i.e., is consistent 
with the results of) using the subjective expected values of available options, given 
the orientations of the individual. 
• Implementation begins. 
• Monitoring (whether it is effective or not) takes place on an ongoing basis. 
• This process is iterative, down to the level of individual utterances or actions: 
-  Routines aimed at particular goals have sub-routines, which have their own 
subgoals;  
-  If a subgoal is satisfied, the individual proceeds to another goal or subgoal; 
-  If a goal is achieved, new goals kick in via decision-making; 
-  If the process is interrupted or things don’t seem to be going well, decision-making 
kicks into action once again. This may or may not result in a change of goals and/or 
the pathways used to try to achieve them. 
Fig. 1 How things work, in outline. From Schoenfeld (2010), p. 18, with permission
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unfamiliar or problematic, they reconsider. It may seem surprising, but if you know
enough about an individual’s resources, goals, and beliefs, this approach allows you
to model their behavior (after a huge amount of work!) on a line-by-line basis.
First Teaching Example, Mark Nelson
Mark Nelson is a beginning teacher. In an elementary algebra class, Nelson has
worked through problems like, x5/x3 = ? Now he has assigned
að Þm6=m2; bð Þ x3y7=x2y6; and cð Þ x5=x5
for the class to work. Nelson expects the students to have little trouble with m6/m2
and x3y7/x2y6, but to be “confused” about x5/x5; he plans to “work through” their
confusion. Here is what happens.
Nelson calls on students to give answers to the ﬁrst two examples. He has a
straightforward method for doing so:
• He asks the students what they got for the answer, and conﬁrms that it is correct.
• He asks how they got the answer.
• Then he elaborates on their responses.
Thus, for example, when a student says the answer to problem (b) is xy, Nelson
asks “why did you get xy?” When the student says that he subtracted, Nelson asks,
“What did you subtract? When the student says “3 minus 2,” Nelson elaborates:
OK. You looked at the x’s [pointing to x-terms in numerator and denominator] and
[pointing to exponents] you subtracted 3 minus 2. That gave you x to the ﬁrst [writes x on
the board]. And then [points to y terms] you looked at the y’s and said [points to the
exponents] 7 minus 6, gives you y to the ﬁrst [writes y on board].
He then asks what to do with x5/x5. They expand and “cancel.” The board shows
xxxxx
xxxxx
. Pointing to that expression, he says, “what do I have?” The responses are
“zero,” “zip,” “nada,” and “nothing” … not what he wants them to see! He tries




Nelson: “But I cancelled. If there’s a 1 there [in 5/5], isn’t there a 1 there
[pointing to the cancelled expression]?”
Students: “No.”
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Defeated, he slumps at the board while students argue there’s “nothing there.”
He looks as if there is nothing he can say or do that will make sense to the students.
He tries again. He points to the expression
xxxxx
xxxxx
and asks what the answer is.
A student says “x to the zero over 1.” Interestingly, Nelson mis-hears this as “x to
the zero equals 1,” which is the correct answer. Relieved, he tells the class,
“That’s right. Get this in your notes: x5/x5 = x0 = 1.”
Any number to the zero power equals 1.”
To put things simply, this is very strange. Nelson certainly knew enough







¼ 15 ¼ 1;
but he didn’t do so. WHY?
There is a simple answer, although it took us a long time to understand it. The
issue has to do with Nelson’s beliefs and orientations about teaching. One of
Nelson’s central beliefs about teaching—the belief that the ideas you discuss must
be generated by the students—shaped what knowledge he did and did not use.
In the ﬁrst example above (reducing the fraction x3y7/x2y6), a student said he had
subtracted. The fact that the student mentioned subtraction gave Nelson “permis-
sion” to explain, which he did: “OK. You looked at the x’s and you subtracted
3 minus 2. That gave you x to the ﬁrst. And then you looked at the y’s and said
7 minus 6, gives you y to the ﬁrst.”




and asked “what do I have?” the only answers from the students
were “zero,” “zip,” “nada,” and “nothing.” Nobody said “1.” And because of his
belief that he had to “build on” what students say, Nelson felt he could not proceed
with the explanation. Only later, when he mis-heard what a student said, was he
able to ﬁnish up his explanation.
[Note: This brief explanation may or may not seem convincing. I note that full
detail is given in the book, and that Nelson was part of the team that analyzed his
videotape. So there is strong evidence that the claims I make here are justiﬁed.]
Second Teaching Example, Jim Minstrell
Here too I provide just a very brief description.
Jim Minstrell is an award-winning teacher who is very thoughtful about his
teaching. It is the beginning of the school year, and he is teaching an introductory
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lesson that involves the use of mean, median, and mode. But, the main point of the
lesson is that Minstrell wants the students to see that such formulas need to be used
sensibly.
The previous day eight students measured the width of a table. They obtained
these values:
106:8; 107:0; 107:0; 107:5; 107:0; 107:0; 106:5; 106:0 cm:
Minstrell wants the students to discuss the “best number” to represent the width
of the table. His plan is for the lesson to have three parts:
1. Which numbers (all or some?) should they use?
2. How should they combine them?
3. With what precision should they report the answer?
Minstrell gave us a tape of the lesson, which we analyzed. The analysis pro-
ceeded in stages. We decomposed the lesson into smaller and smaller “episodes,”
noting for each episode which goals were present, and observing how transitions
corresponded to changes in goals. In this way, we decomposed the entire lesson—
starting with the lesson as a whole, and ultimately characterizing what happened on
a line-by-line basis. See Figs. 2 and 3 (next pages) for an example of analytic detail.
Figure 2 shows the whole lesson, and then breaks it into major episodes (lesson
Fig. 2 A “top level” view of Minstrell’s lesson, “unfolding” in levels of detail. (With permission,
from Schoenfeld 2010, pp. 96–97)
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segments), each of which has its own internal structure. Most of the lesson was very
simple to analyze in this way.
Minstrell has a flexible “script” for each part of the lesson:
• He will raise the issue;
• He will ask the class for a suggestion;
• He will clarify and pursue the student suggestion by asking questions, inserting
some content if necessary.
Once the suggestion has been worked through, he will ask for more suggestions.
When students run out of ideas, he may inject more ideas, or move to the next part
of the lesson.
In this way, the lesson unfolds naturally, and it is easy to “capture” it—see Fig. 2
for a “top level” summary of how the lesson unfolded. The episodes in the second
and third columns, which correspond to an analysis of the lesson as taught, show
that Minstrell did cover the big topics as planned.
Fig. 3 A more ﬁne-grained parsing of Episode [1.2.2.3]. (From Schoenfeld 2010, pp. 116–117,
with permission)
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A line-by-line analysis (see Schoenfeld 1998, 2010) shows that when Minstrell
was dealing with expected subject matter, he followed the “script” described above
very closely. So, it is easy to model Minstrell’s behavior when he is on familiar
ground.
But what about unusual events? Remember the data: The eight values the stu-
dents had obtained for the width of the table were
106:8; 107:0; 107:0; 107:5; 107:0; 107:0; 106:5; 106:0 cm:
As the lesson unfolded, Minstrell asked the students about “a way of getting the
best value.” (see box 1.2.2 in the third column of Fig. 2.) As the class proceeded,
one student mentioned the idea of using the “average” and, when asked by
Minstrell, provided a deﬁnition. (Box 1.2.2.1 in the fourth column of Fig. 2.)
Another student mentioned mode (Box 1.2.2.2). Then, a student said:
This is a little complicated but I mean it might work. If you see that 107 shows up 4 times,
you give it a coefﬁcient of 4, and then 107.5 only shows up one time, you give it a
coefﬁcient of one, you add all those up and then you divide by the number of coefﬁcients
you have.
This is an unexpected comment, which does not ﬁt directly with Minstrell’s
flexible script. The question is, can we say what Minstrell would do when some-
thing unexpected, like this, arises in the middle of his lesson?
Before proceeding, I want to point out that there is a wide range of responses,
which teachers might produce. I have seen responses like all of the following:
That’s a very interesting question. I’ll talk to you about it after class.
Excellent question. I need to get through today’s plans so you can do tonight’s assigned
homework, but I’ll discuss it tomorrow.
That’s neat. What you’ve just described is known as the ‘weighted average.’ Let me briefly
explain how you can work with that…
Let me write that up as a formula and see what folks think of it.
Let’s make sure we all understand what you’ve suggested, and then explore it.
So, teachers might do very different things. Is it possible to know what Minstrell
will do? According to our model of Minstrell, (1) His fundamental orientation
toward teaching is that physics is a sense-making activity and that students should
experience it as such; (2) One of his major goals is to support inquiry and to honor
student attempts at ﬁguring things out; (3) His resource base includes favored
techniques such as “reflective tosses”—asking questions that get students to
explain/elaborate on what they said.
Thus, the model predicts that he will pursue the last option—making sure that
the students understand the issue that the student has raised (including the ambi-
guity about how you add the coefﬁcients; do you divide by 5 or 8?) and pursuing it.
He will do so by asking the students questions and working with the ideas they
produce.
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This is, in fact, what Minstrell did. Figure 3 shows how that segment of the
lesson evolved. It is an elaboration of Box 1.2.2.3 in Fig. 2.
As noted above, it is possible to model Minstrell’s decision. The model shows
that, when faced with options such as those listed above, Minstrell is by far most
likely to pursue the one I have indicated. The computations take about seven pages
of text, so I will spare you the detail! More generally:
We have found that we were able to capture Minstrell’s routine decision-making,
on a line-by-line basis, by characterizing his knowledge/resources and modeling
them as described in Fig. 1, “How Things Work;” and,
We were able to model Minstrell’s non-routine decision-making using a form
of subjective expected value computation, where we considered the various alter-
natives and looked at how consistent they were with Minstrell’s beliefs and values
(his orientations).
In summary, we were able to model every decision Minstrell made during the
hour-long class.
Third Teaching Example, Deborah Ball
Some years ago, at a meeting, Deborah Ball showed a video of a third grade
classroom lesson she had taught. The lesson was amazing—and it was controver-
sial. In it,
• Third graders argued on solid mathematical grounds;
• The discussion agenda evolved as a function of classroom conversations;
• The teacher seemed at times to play a negligible role, and she made at least one
decision that people said was not sensible.
In addition, I had little or no intuition about what happened. Thus, this was a
perfect tape to study! There were major differences from cases 1 and 2:
• the students were third graders instead of high school students;
• psychological (developmental) issues differed because of the children’s age;
• the “control structure” for the classroom was much more “organic”;
• the teacher played a less obvious “directing” role.
The question was, could I model what happened in this lesson? If so, then the
theory covered an extremely wide range of examples, which would comprise
compelling evidence of its general validity. If not, then I would understand the
limits of the theory. (Perhaps, for example, it would only apply to teacher-directed
lessons at the high school level.)
Here is what happened during the lesson. Ball’s third grade class had been
studying combinations of integers, and they had been thinking about the fact that,
for example, the sum of two even numbers always seemed to be even. The previous
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day Ball’s students had met with some 4th graders, to discuss the properties of even
numbers, odd numbers, and zero. Ball had wanted her students to see that these
were complex issues and that even the “big” fourth graders were struggling with
them. The day after the meeting (the day of this lesson), Ball started the class by
asking what the students thought about the meeting:
• How do they think about that experience?
• How do they think about their own thinking and learning?
Ball had students come up to the board to discuss “what they learned from the
meeting.” The discussion (a transcript of which is given in full in Schoenfeld 2008,
2010) covered a lot of territory, with Ball seemingly playing a small role as students
argued about the properties of zero (is it even? odd? “special”?). For the most part,
Ball kept her students focused on the “meta-level” question: what did they learn
about their own thinking from the meeting with the fourth graders the previous day?
But then, after a student made a comment, Ball interrupted him to ask a
mathematical question about the student’s understanding. This question, which
took almost 3 min to resolve, completely disrupted the flow of the lesson. Many
people, when watching the tape of the lesson, call that decision a “mistake.” How
could Ball, who is a very careful, thoughtful, and experienced teacher, do such a
thing? If the decision was arbitrary or capricious in some way, that is a problem for
the theory. If highly experienced teachers make arbitrary decisions, it would be
impossible to model teachers’ decision making in general.
In sum, this part of the lesson seems to unfold without Ball playing a directive
role in its development—and she made an unusual decision to interrupt the flow of
conversation. Can this be modeled? The answer is yes. A ﬁne-grained analysis
reveals that Ball has a “debrieﬁng routine” that consists of asking questions and
fleshing out answers. That routine is given in Fig. 4.
In fact, Ball uses that routine ﬁve times in the ﬁrst 6 min of class. Moreover, once
you understand Ball’s plans for the lesson, her unexpected decision—what has been
called her “mistake” by some—can be seen as entirely reasonable and consistent with
her agenda. This has beenmodeled in great detail. For the full analysis, see Schoenfeld
2010; for an analytic diagram showing the full analysis, download Appendix E from
my web page, http://www-gse.berkeley.edu/faculty/AHSchoenfeld/AHSchoenfeld.
html.
To sum things up: As in the two previous cases, (1) We were able to model
Ball’s routine decision-making, on a line-by-line basis, by characterizing her
knowledge/resources and modeling them as described in Fig. 1. (2) We were able to
model Ball’s non-routine decision-making as a form of subjective expected value
computation.
In short, we were able to model every move Ball made during the lesson
segment.
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Fig. 4 A flexible, interruptible routine for discussing a topic. (From Schoenfeld 2010, p. 129, with
permission)
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Yet More Examples
Making Breakfast (or Any Other Meal)
If you look at Fig. 1, you can see that it would be easy to model decision-making
during cooking. Usually we have ﬁxed routines for cooking familiar meals. And if
something changes (for example, when my daughter asks me to make a fancy
breakfast), that calls for a “non-routine” decision, which can also be modeled.
Readers might enjoy creating models of their own cooking practices and decision
making.
Routine Medical Diagnosis and Practice
To see if my ideas worked outside of the classroom, I asked my doctor if I could
tape and analyze one of my ofﬁce visits with her. She said yes; an analysis of our
conversation is given in How We Think. The conversation was easy to model,
because the doctor follows a straightforward (and flexible) script. Modeling a two-
person interaction is a lot easier than modeling a classroom; it is more like modeling
a tutoring interaction. When the person being modeled (in this case, the doctor) only
has to pay attention to one other person (instead of the 30 children a teacher has to
pay attention to), decision-making is comparatively simple—and simple to model.
I should also note that there is a very large artiﬁcial intelligence literature on
modeling doctors’ decision making—there are computer programs that make
diagnoses, etc. (The ﬁeld is well established: see, e.g., Clancey and Shortliffe 1984).
So, the idea that it is possible to capture doctors’ routine decision making is not
new. More recent, and also consistent with my emphasis on beliefs as shaping
behavior, there are studies (e.g., Groopman 2007) of how doctors’ stereotypes
(beliefs and orientations) regarding patient behavior lead them to miss what should
be straightforward diagnoses.
Discussion
The approach I have outlined in this paper “covers” routine and non-routine
problem solving, routine and non-routine teaching, cooking, and brain surgery—
and every other example of “well practiced,” knowledge-based behavior that I can
think of. All told, I believe it works pretty well as a theory of “how we think.”
Readers have the right to ask, why would someone spend 25 years trying to
build and test a theory like this? Here is my response.
First, theory building and testing should be central parts of doing research in
mathematics education. That is how we make progress.
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Second, the more we understand something the better we can make it work;
when we understand how something skillful is done we can help others do it. This
was the idea behind my problem solving work, where an understanding of problem
solving helped me to help students become better problem solvers. I believe that a
comparably deep understanding of teachers’ decision making can be used to help
mathematics teachers become more effective.
Third, this approach has the potential to provide tools for describing develop-
mental trajectories of teachers. Beginning teachers, for example, often struggle with
issues of classroom “management”—of creating an orderly classroom environment
in which their students can learn productively. While teachers are struggling at this,
they have little time or attention to devote to some of the more subtle aspects of expert
teaching, such as teaching responsively—listening carefully to what their students
say, diagnosing what the students understand and misunderstand, and shaping
the lesson so that it helps move the students forward mathematically. The more we
understand what teachers understand at particular points in their careers, the more we
will be able to provide relevant professional development activities for them. An
understanding of teachers’ developmental trajectories can help us help teachers get
better at helping their students learn. (see Chap. 8 of Schoenfeld 2010, for detail.)
Fourth and ﬁnally, it’s fun! The challenge of understanding human behavior has
proved itself to be every bit as interesting and intellectually rewarding as the
challenge of understanding mathematics. It has occupied me for the past 35 years,
and I look forward to many more years of explorations. Exploring questions of how
teachers’ understandings develop, and of how and when one can foster the
development of mathematics teachers’ expertise, are intellectually challenging.
Equally important, addressing them can, over the long run, lead to improvements in
mathematics teaching and learning.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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